这几年做跨境物流，最明显的变化不是“谁又开了一条航线”，而是中国物流公司终于开始认真回答一个问题：出海到底是卖舱位、卖小包、卖海外仓，还是在海外重新搭一套履约网络？这个问题不想清楚，包机再多、海外仓再多，也只是把国内的焦虑搬到国外。
先说结论：出海不是开航线，而是重建商业闭环
很多人看快递公司出海，第一眼会看飞机、仓库、海外网点。其实这些只是表层。
真正决定出海成败的，是五件事：
| 核心问题 | 为什么重要 | 做不好会怎样 |
|---|
| 有没有稳定商流 | 决定包裹从哪里来、是否能长期填满网络 | 航线和仓库变成成本中心 |
| 有没有清关能力 | 决定跨境包裹能不能稳定放行 | 时效不稳定、扣关率上升 |
| 有没有本地末端 | 决定最后一公里体验 | 只能依赖当地邮政或第三方 |
| 有没有重资产决心 | 决定能不能形成护城河 | 永远停留在渠道商层面 |
| 有没有全球组织能力 | 决定能不能把总部战略落到当地 | 收购、合资、代理网络变成“各干各的” |
所以，本文不只比较“谁规模大”，而是看每家公司有没有把跨境物流从一段运力生意，做成一套可复制的海外履约体系。
本文是基于公开资料和行业观察的个人分析，不构成投资建议，也不代表任何官方评价。上市公司经营数据以公告和年报为准。
顺丰：出海很早，但真正打出声量是在疫情包机之后
顺丰是中国快递公司里较早认真做国际化的一家。
早期顺丰国际给行业的印象是：品牌好、服务意识强、航空资源强，但海外网络一直没有形成像国内时效件那样的压倒性优势。原因不复杂：顺丰擅长的是高品质物流，但跨境电商时代的核心变量往往是商流。
疫情期间，全球客机腹舱运力骤减，顺丰凭借自有航空和包机能力抓住了窗口期。那个阶段，顺丰在国际空运、跨境电商包裹、医疗物资运输上确实打出了存在感。很多客户第一次发现：中国快递公司不是只能做国内，也能组织跨境空运大通道。
但疫情红利过去后，问题又回来了：运力能力和长期商流不是一回事。
顺丰在国内是高毛利、高服务质量的天花板级快递企业，但它终究还是物流公司。物流的特点是辛苦、资产重、毛利受成本约束，和电商、广告、支付、金融这类生意不能直接比。没有强绑定商流，海外扩张就会天然更谨慎。
这也是顺丰多年出海给人的矛盾感：战略上一直想做全球化，打法上又经常想花相对克制的钱办很大的事。
收购嘉里物流：顺丰买到的是网络，也是复杂度
顺丰收购嘉里物流，行业当时普遍认为是补国际短板的一步大棋。嘉里在亚洲、东南亚、国际货代、合同物流上有基础，确实能给顺丰补上不少网络和客户资源。
但从实际效果看，这笔账不能只用“有没有海外网络”来算。
| 收购带来的价值 | 同时带来的难题 |
|---|
| 获得亚洲和东南亚物流基础 | 业务文化、客户结构和管理体系需要融合 |
| 增强国际货代和供应链能力 | 货代业务受海空运价周期影响明显 |
| 提升全球客户服务入口 | 和顺丰原有快递体系协同并不天然顺滑 |
| 让顺丰国际化叙事更完整 | 欧美末端网络仍然不是核心强项 |
比较直白地说，嘉里让顺丰在亚洲更像一个综合物流公司，但没有让顺丰在欧美突然变成 DHL、UPS 或 FedEx。
顺丰 2025 年报里也能看到它现在更强调“亚洲唯一、全球覆盖”的战略表达，而不是盲目说自己全球全能。这个口径反而更现实：先把亚洲跨境、区域快递、供应链和国际货代打扎实，再谈全球。
我的判断是：顺丰未来的出海机会不在“什么都做”，而在几个高价值场景：
- 高端时效件
- 中国品牌出海的供应链项目
- 亚太区域跨境快递
- 医药、电子、高价值工业品
- 航空干线和重点国家的清关能力
顺丰最大的问题不是能力弱，而是要接受一个事实：没有商流平台托底，就不能用平台公司的打法做物流全球化。
京东物流：不算最早，但战略反而更像“想明白以后再动手”
京东物流出海不算早。早些年，它的精力主要在中国：仓配一体、211、大家电、逆向、供应链、直营网点。这些都是重活、慢活。
但正因为在国内吃过重资产的苦，京东物流后来出海时反而有后发优势。它不是简单去海外找代理、卖专线、做小包，而是把国内验证过的履约能力拆成几块搬出去：
- 先建海外仓和本地库存能力。
- 再做仓配一体和本地配送。
- 同时补干线、清关、末端和系统能力。
- 最后服务中国品牌、跨境卖家和海外本地客户。
京东物流 2025 年业绩资料显示，其已经实现“自营海外仓面积翻番”目标，拥有近 200 个保税仓、直邮仓和海外仓，总管理面积近 200 万平方米，并在美洲、欧洲、中东、亚太等区域推进海外业务。
这就很像在海外重新建一个缩小版京东物流。
说得更形象一点：京东不是只想在亚马逊的地盘上卖物流服务，而是想把一套“中国式高密度履约系统”搬到欧美和中东去。这个打法重、慢、烧钱，但一旦跑通，护城河也更深。
| 维度 | 京东物流的优势 | 代价 |
|---|
| 海外仓 | 更接近本地履约，而不是单纯跨境小包 | 租金、人工、库存和系统投入大 |
| 本地配送 | 可以提升体验确定性 | 需要长期运营密度 |
| 供应链客户 | 能服务品牌方和 B2B/B2C 混合需求 | 销售周期长，客户定制复杂 |
| 技术系统 | 国内仓配经验可迁移 | 海外规则、劳工、合规要重新适配 |
我更看好京东物流的原因，不是它今天已经赢了，而是它的战略闭环更清楚：商流不完全依赖别人，物流产品也不只停在干线和小包。
当然，重资产投入会带来财务和经营压力。海外仓空置、库存周转慢、本地人工成本高、退货处理复杂，都会侵蚀利润。判断京东物流出海是否真正走顺，不能只看仓库数量，而要看三个指标：海外仓利用率、外部客户收入质量、本地末端履约成本。
卖家如果要对比海外仓备货和小包直发的成本，建议先把货物体积重、仓储天数、旺季附加费拆开算。比如空运备货前，可以用 OneCargoKit 的 Chargeable Weight Calculator 先估体积重；如果涉及海外仓滞留和长期库存，再用 Storage & Demurrage Calculator 做一个粗测。
菜鸟：商流最强，但战略摇摆也最明显
菜鸟出海也很早，而且它有一个别人羡慕不来的优势：阿里系商流。
AliExpress、阿里国际站、Lazada、Trendyol、淘宝海外、天猫相关出海业务，都能给菜鸟提供跨境包裹和履约需求。阿里 2025 财年数据显示，菜鸟在国际物流业务带动下年度营收达到 1012.72 亿元；在 2024 财年，菜鸟跨境和国际业务日均履约包裹量超过 500 万个。
这类商流，是物流公司梦寐以求的底盘。
菜鸟的海外打法主要是“枢纽 + 干线 + 清关 + 末端合作 + 部分自营”。香港、列日、吉隆坡等 eHub，是它全球网络的重要节点。尤其列日和香港，一个连欧洲，一个连亚洲航空网络，对跨境电商小包很有意义。
但菜鸟的问题也很明显：战略曾经摇摆过。
最早菜鸟更像平台，强调社会化物流协同；后来又越来越多自建仓、建枢纽、做干线、做末端，甚至要做全球快递。平台和自营之间不是不能切换，但切换会带来组织和资源配置问题。
| 菜鸟优势 | 菜鸟挑战 |
|---|
| 阿里系商流强，包裹密度高 | 对平台生态依赖较高 |
| eHub 和跨境小包经验丰富 | 自营与平台边界需要长期稳定 |
| 资金和技术基础较好 | 人员流动和组织调整影响执行连续性 |
| 能做全球 5 日达、10 日达等产品化表达 | 欧美本地末端控制力仍需验证 |
我对菜鸟的判断是：它很强，但强在“电商履约网络”，不一定强在“综合物流公司”。它天然适合做跨境电商包裹、合单、清关、分拨、平台物流履约；但如果要和 DHL、UPS、FedEx 在欧美本土 B2B、B2C 高价值件上硬碰硬，路径还需要更清晰。
菜鸟未来最该避免的是两件事：一是为了服务所有平台而削弱阿里系商流优势；二是为了证明自己是全球物流公司，过度进入不擅长的重资产场景。
跨境卖家使用平台物流时，不要只看“几日达”宣传，最好同时核对 HS 编码、申报价值、目的国税费和清关口径。出货前可以用 OneCargoKit 的 HS Code Lookup 做初筛，再交给报关行或渠道方确认。
三通一达：出海多年，但多数还是边缘业务
三通一达都或多或少做过国际化。圆通有航空，开过国际货运航线；中通、申通、韵达也都有国际业务或相关网络布局。
但从行业体感看，三通一达的出海整体更像“有动作，但没有形成决定性心智”。尤其和顺丰、京东、菜鸟比，缺少足够清晰的海外商业闭环。
圆通相对特殊。它有自有航空，年报和公开报道显示，圆通持续推进国际航线、航空货运和跨境全链路服务，2024 年已累计开通 150 多条货运航线。它不是完全没布局，甚至在航空资源上比很多同行更认真。
但问题在于，航空资源只是一个环节。没有足够强的海外仓、清关、本地末端、商流入口，包机和货机很容易变成“某个阶段看起来热闹”，但很难变成长期稳定的全球快递网络。
三通一达的基因是加盟网络和极致成本效率。这个基因在国内电商件里很强，但出海需要面对完全不同的约束：
- 海外人工成本高
- 当地合规复杂
- 末端派送密度不足
- 客诉和赔付标准不同
- 清关和税务风险更高
- 大促波峰波谷更难消化
所以我倾向于把三通一达的出海定位为：可以做补充，可以做专线，可以做区域机会，但短期很难成为主线叙事。
中国邮政：国家队底子厚，但机制先天不适合快节奏商业战
中国邮政是国家队，天然有国际邮政体系和普遍服务基础。对很多传统跨境小包来说，邮政体系曾经是最重要的通道之一。
但如果谈“商业化出海竞争”，中国邮政的问题就不只是“慢”这么简单，而是体制机制先天不适配高度市场化的跨境电商物流竞争。
跨境电商物流变化太快。平台政策可能一周一变，清关口径可能因为某个品类突然收紧，欧美本地派送价格会随旺季、人工、燃油和罢工风险快速波动，卖家的流量结构也会从 Amazon、AliExpress、Temu、TikTok Shop、独立站之间不断切换。这个市场要求物流公司能快速定价、快速试错、快速补网络、快速赔付、快速调整产品。
邮政体系的问题恰恰在这里：资源不缺，但资源转化成市场产品的速度太慢；网络很广，但网络不等于客户体验；有国家队信用，但信用不等于商业竞争力。
公开资料显示，中国邮政航空在 2024 年开通南京至卢森堡的独立运营洲际航线，并提到当时邮航机队超过 40 架、包含两架 B777F 货机。这说明邮政并不是完全没有动作，也不是没有投入。
问题是，投入和打法之间仍有巨大距离。
| 邮政手里的牌 | 体制短板 | 市场结果 |
|---|
| 国际邮政体系和国家队背书 | 决策链条长，市场反馈慢 | 稳定有余，进攻不足 |
| 航空和口岸资源 | 产品化、销售化能力弱 | 客户很难感知差异化 |
| 覆盖面广 | 本地末端体验不可控 | 适合基础通道，不适合高要求履约 |
| 公共服务属性强 | 盈亏压力和商业激励不够直接 | 很难像民企一样贴身肉搏 |
说得尖锐一点：如果京东是在海外重建履约系统，菜鸟是在商流上叠物流，顺丰是在用品牌和航空能力补国际短板，那么中国邮政更像是拿着一副好牌，但出牌总是慢半拍。等内部流程走完，市场价格、平台规则、清关要求和卖家需求可能都变了。
在跨境电商卖家眼里，中国邮政仍然更像一个基础通道、普惠通道、某些目的国的稳定补充，而不是一个能主动帮品牌做全球履约方案的商业物流伙伴。
买全新 B777F 当然很有气势，但货运航空的核心不是飞机新不新，而是航线密度、货源结构、回程货、枢纽效率、销售组织和产品化能力。没有这些，再好的飞机也只是昂贵的运力。
我对中国邮政的判断比前几年更悲观：它不会消失，也不会没有价值，但如果组织机制、市场激励和产品化能力没有明显变化，它很难成为中国快递出海的主角。它更可能长期扮演基础通道、应急通道、普惠通道的角色，而不是在欧美市场和商业平台、品牌客户一起快速卷履约体验的角色。
横向对比：谁更像未来赢家
| 公司 | 出海时间 | 核心优势 | 核心短板 | 我对未来的判断 |
|---|
| 顺丰 | 早 | 品牌、航空、高端服务、亚洲网络 | 商流不足，欧美末端弱，整合复杂 | 适合做亚太和高价值供应链 |
| 京东物流 | 较晚 | 仓配一体、供应链能力、重资产决心 | 财务压力大，本地运营难 | 最像在认真复制海外履约系统 |
| 菜鸟 | 早 | 阿里商流、跨境小包、eHub | 战略边界摇摆，组织稳定性待验证 | 电商履约强，但需稳定方向 |
| 圆通 | 早 | 航空资源、成本效率 | 海外闭环不足 | 有机会做航线和区域专线 |
| 中通/申通/韵达 | 有布局 | 国内网络和成本能力 | 国际心智弱、商流弱 | 更像机会型补充 |
| 中国邮政 | 很早 | 邮政体系、国家队、基础网络 | 机制僵化、市场反应慢、产品化弱 | 基础价值仍在，但商业出海主角很难 |
如果只选一个“最有机会把中国物流卷到欧美”的公司，我会选京东物流。
原因不是京东没有问题，而是它的问题更像“重资产投入后的经营爬坡”，而不是“商业模式还没想清”。前者难，但可以被时间、密度和客户结构改善；后者会反复消耗组织。
给跨境卖家的实操判断
不要把物流公司出海当成新闻看，要当成供应链选择题看。
选渠道时可以问五个问题：
- [ ] 这家公司在目的国有没有真实仓库和本地操作团队？
- [ ] 清关是自控、合作，还是完全外包？
- [ ] 末端派送由谁完成，赔付和客诉谁负责？
- [ ] 旺季是否有稳定航线和舱位保障？
- [ ] 价格里是否包含燃油、偏远、住宅、超长、仓储等附加费？
跨境物流报价最怕只看头程价。很多看起来便宜的渠道，真正成本藏在附加费、库存周转、退件处理和目的国税费里。报价前可以用 OneCargoKit 的 Surcharge Calculator 把常见附加费拆开看；如果客户要求 DDP、DAP、海外仓本地派送，也建议用 Incoterms 2020 Calculator 先把责任边界说清楚。
常见误区
飞机解决干线，不解决清关、仓配、末端和商流。
海外仓是资产，也是成本。关键看利用率、库存周转和订单密度。
平台有商流优势，但也可能受平台策略、补贴和规则调整影响。
- 误区四：国内快递卷出来的成本能力可以直接复制到欧美。
欧美人工、合规、土地、工会、税务和派送环境完全不同。
网络广不等于产品强，国家队稳定不等于市场反应快。跨境电商物流拼的是速度、产品、成本和体验闭环，不是只拼底层覆盖。
专业总结
中国快递公司出海，已经从“有没有国际业务”进入“有没有海外履约体系”的阶段。
顺丰胜在品牌、航空和高端服务，但要克服商流不足和海外重资产不足的问题；京东物流虽然晚，但战略闭环更清楚，重仓海外仓和本地履约，未来最值得关注；菜鸟有最强商流底座和跨境小包能力，但需要持续稳定平台与自营的边界；三通一达整体仍偏机会型；中国邮政的问题更根本，不是没有资源，而是国企机制天然偏稳、偏慢、偏流程化，难以适应跨境电商物流瞬息万变的市场节奏。
未来真正跑出来的中国物流公司，不会只是“把包裹从中国送到国外”的公司，而会是能在海外帮中国品牌完成库存、清关、派送、退货、售后和数据闭环的公司。
说到底，出海不是谁喊得早，而是谁能在海外把网络密度、成本效率和客户体验长期跑出来。
参考资料与延伸阅读
The most striking change in cross-border logistics over the past few years has not been ‘who has launched yet another route’, but rather that Chinese logistics companies have finally begun to seriously address one question: when expanding overseas, is the focus on selling shipping capacity, small parcels or overseas warehouses, or on building a new fulfilment network abroad?Unless this question is properly addressed, no matter how many charter flights or overseas warehouses there are, it will merely shift domestic anxieties abroad.
To put it simply: expanding overseas is not about launching new routes, but about rebuilding a closed-loop business model
When many people look at courier companies expanding overseas, their first glance tends to fall on aeroplanes, warehouses and overseas outlets. In reality, these are merely superficial aspects.
What truly determines the success or failure of international expansion comes down to five key factors:
| The Core Issue | Why it matters | What happens if it’s not done properly |
|---|
| Is there a stable flow of business? | Determines where parcels come from and whether the network can be sustained over the long term | Routes and warehouses become cost centres |
| Do you have customs clearance capabilities? | This determines whether cross-border parcels can be cleared consistently | Delivery times are unreliable and the rate of parcels being held at customs is rising |
| Availability of local last-mile delivery | determines the last-mile experience | Reliance solely on the local postal service or third-party providers |
| Whether there is a commitment to capital-intensive operations | determines whether a competitive moat can be established | Will you remain forever at the level of a channel partner? |
| Whether there is the capacity for global organisation | determines whether headquarters’ strategy can be implemented locally | Acquisitions, joint ventures and agency networks end up operating in silos |
Therefore, this article does not merely compare ‘who is the largest’, but examines whether each company has transformed cross-border logistics from a one-off transport capacity business into a replicable overseas fulfilment system.
This article is a personal analysis based on publicly available information and industry observations; it does not constitute investment advice, nor does it represent any official assessment. Operational data for listed companies is subject to announcements and annual reports.
SF Express: Entered the international market early, but only truly made a name for itself following the pandemic-era charter flights
SF Express was one of the first Chinese express delivery companies to take internationalisation seriously.
In its early days, SF International was perceived by the industry as having a strong brand, a strong service ethos and robust aviation resources; however, its overseas network never managed to establish the same overwhelming advantage as its domestic express delivery services. The reason is straightforward: whilst SF excels at high-quality logistics, the core determinant in the era of cross-border e-commerce is often the flow of goods.
During the pandemic, global cargo capacity in the bellies of passenger aircraft plummeted, and SF Express seized this window of opportunity by leveraging its own fleet and chartered flight capabilities. During that period, SF Express certainly made its presence felt in international air freight, cross-border e-commerce parcels and the transport of medical supplies.Many customers realised for the first time that Chinese express companies were not limited to domestic operations, but could also organise major cross-border air freight corridors.
However, once the pandemic-driven windfall had passed, the problem resurfaced: transport capacity and long-term commercial flow are not one and the same.
Domestically, SF Express is a top-tier courier firm with high profit margins and high service quality, but it remains, at its core, a logistics company. Logistics is characterised by hard work, heavy capital investment and profit margins constrained by costs; it cannot be directly compared with businesses such as e-commerce, advertising, payments or finance. Without a strong tie to commercial flows, overseas expansion will naturally be approached with greater caution.
This is also the sense of contradiction that SF Express has conveyed during its years of overseas expansion: strategically, it has always aspired to globalisation, yet tactically, it has often sought to achieve significant results with relatively modest investment.
The Acquisition of Kerry Logistics: SF Express Gains a Network, but Also Complexity
When SF Express acquired Kerry Logistics, the industry widely regarded it as a masterstroke to address its international shortcomings. With a strong foundation in Asia, South-East Asia, international freight forwarding and contract logistics, Kerry could indeed provide SF Express with significant network and customer resources.
However, judging by the actual results, the benefits of this deal cannot be assessed solely on the basis of ‘whether or not it provides an overseas network’.
| The Value Derived from the Acquisition | The challenges it also brought |
|---|
| Gaining a logistics foothold in Asia and South-East Asia | Business culture, client base and management systems require integration |
| Strengthening international freight forwarding and supply chain capabilities | Freight forwarding operations are significantly affected by fluctuations in sea and air freight rates |
| Enhancing the global customer service portal | Synergy with SF Express’s existing courier network is not inherently seamless |
| Making SF Express’s internationalisation narrative more complete | Last-mile networks in Europe and the US remain a non-core strength |
To put it quite simply, Kerry has enabled SF Express to function more like an integrated logistics company in Asia, but it has not suddenly transformed SF Express into a DHL, UPS or FedEx in Europe and the US.
SF Express’s 2025 annual report also reflects a greater emphasis on the strategic positioning of being ‘unique in Asia, with global coverage’, rather than blindly claiming to be a global all-rounder. This approach is, in fact, more realistic: first consolidate cross-border operations in Asia, regional express delivery, supply chain management and international freight forwarding, and then consider global expansion.
My assessment is that SF Express’s future opportunities for global expansion do not lie in ‘doing everything’, but rather in several high-value scenarios:
- High-end time-sensitive parcels
- Supply chain projects for Chinese brands expanding overseas
- Cross-border express delivery within the Asia-Pacific region
- Pharmaceuticals, electronics and high-value industrial goods
- Air trunk routes and customs clearance capabilities in key countries
SF Express’s biggest problem is not a lack of capability, but rather the need to accept the fact that, without a commercial platform to underpin it, it cannot pursue global logistics expansion using the strategies of a platform company.
JD Logistics: Not the first to enter the market, but its strategy is more akin to ‘thinking things through before taking action’
JD Logistics did not venture overseas particularly early. In its early years, its focus was primarily on China: integrated warehousing and distribution, the ‘211’ service, large household appliances, reverse logistics, supply chain management and directly-operated outlets. These are all labour-intensive and time-consuming endeavours.
However, precisely because it had endured the hardships of heavy asset investment domestically, JD Logistics actually enjoyed a late-mover advantage when it later expanded overseas. Rather than simply seeking agents abroad, selling dedicated routes or handling small parcels, it broke down its domestically proven fulfilment capabilities into several components and replicated them overseas:
- First, it established overseas warehouses and local inventory capacity.
- It then implemented integrated warehousing and distribution alongside local delivery services.
- At the same time, it bolstered its capabilities in trunk transport, customs clearance, last-mile delivery and systems.
- Finally, it serves Chinese brands, cross-border sellers and local overseas customers.
JD Logistics’ 2025 performance figures show that it has already achieved its target of ‘doubling the floor area of its self-operated overseas warehouses’. It now operates nearly 200 bonded warehouses, direct-mail warehouses and overseas fulfilment centres, with a total managed floor area of nearly 2 million square metres, and is expanding its overseas operations across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region.
This is very much like rebuilding a scaled-down version of JD Logistics overseas.
To put it more vividly: JD Logistics does not merely wish to sell logistics services on Amazon’s turf, but aims to transplant a ‘Chinese-style high-density fulfilment system’ to Europe, the Americas and the Middle East. This strategy is resource-intensive, slow and costly, but once it proves successful, the resulting moat will be even deeper.
| Dimensions | JD Logistics’ Strengths | Costs |
|---|
| Overseas Warehouses | Closer to local fulfilment, rather than simply cross-border small parcels | Significant investment in rent, labour, stock and systems |
| Local Delivery | Can enhance the reliability of the customer experience | Requires long-term operational density |
| Supply chain clients | Can serve both brand owners and mixed B2B/B2C requirements | Long sales cycles and complex customer customisation |
| Technical systems | Domestic warehousing and distribution experience is transferable | Overseas regulations, labour practices and compliance requirements need to be adapted |
The reason I am more optimistic about JD Logistics is not that it has already succeeded today, but that its strategic ecosystem is clearer: its commercial operations do not rely entirely on others, and its logistics offerings extend beyond trunk routes and small parcels.
Of course, heavy capital investment will bring financial and operational pressures.Vacant overseas warehouses, slow inventory turnover, high local labour costs and complex returns processing will all erode profits. To assess whether JD Logistics’ overseas expansion is truly on the right track, one must look beyond the number of warehouses and focus on three key indicators: overseas warehouse utilisation rates, the quality of revenue from external clients, and local last-mile fulfilment costs.
If sellers wish to compare the costs of stocking overseas warehouses with those of direct small-parcel dispatch, it is advisable to break down the calculations by volumetric weight, storage duration and peak-season surcharges.For example, before stocking up for air freight, you can use OneCargoKit’s Chargeable Weight Calculator to estimate the volumetric weight; if there are concerns about goods being held up in overseas warehouses or long-term stock, you can then use the Storage & Demurrage Calculator to make a rough estimate.
Cainiao: Strongest in commercial flow, but also the most evident in strategic vacillation
Cainiao entered the cross-border market very early on and possesses an advantage that others can only envy: the Alibaba ecosystem’s commercial flow.
AliExpress, Alibaba International, Lazada, Trendyol, Taobao Global and Tmall’s related overseas operations all provide Cainiao with cross-border parcel and fulfilment demand.Data from Alibaba’s 2025 financial year shows that, driven by its international logistics business, Cainiao’s annual revenue reached 101.272 billion yuan; in the 2024 financial year, the average daily fulfilment volume for Cainiao’s cross-border and international operations exceeded 5 million parcels.
This type of commercial flow represents the ideal foundation that logistics companies dream of.
Cainiao’s overseas strategy primarily centres on a model of ‘hubs + trunk lines + customs clearance + last-mile partnerships + partial in-house operations’. eHubs in Hong Kong, Liège and Kuala Lumpur serve as key nodes in its global network. Liège and Hong Kong, in particular—one connecting to European air networks and the other to Asian air networks—are of significant importance for cross-border e-commerce small parcels.
However, Cainiao’s problems are also evident: its strategy has wavered in the past.
Initially, Cainiao functioned more like a platform, emphasising the coordination of socialised logistics; later, it increasingly moved towards building its own warehouses, establishing hubs, operating trunk routes and managing last-mile delivery, and even sought to provide global express services. Whilst it is not impossible to switch between a platform model and a self-operated model, such a shift brings with it organisational and resource allocation challenges.
| Cainiao’s Strengths | Cainiao’s Challenges |
|---|
| Strong commercial flow within the Alibaba ecosystem and high parcel density | High dependence on the platform ecosystem |
| Extensive experience with eHubs and cross-border small parcels | The boundary between self-operated and platform-based operations requires long-term stability |
| Solid financial and technological foundations | Staff turnover and organisational restructuring affect operational continuity |
| Capable of offering standardised delivery services such as ‘5-day’ and ‘10-day’ global delivery | Control over the last-mile delivery network in Europe and the US remains to be proven |
My assessment of Cainiao is that it is strong, but its strength lies in its ‘e-commerce fulfilment network’, not necessarily as a ‘comprehensive logistics company’.It is naturally well-suited to handling cross-border e-commerce parcels, order consolidation, customs clearance, sorting and platform logistics fulfilment; however, if it is to go head-to-head with DHL, UPS and FedEx in the high-value B2B and B2C sectors in Europe and the US, its strategy still needs to be more clearly defined.
There are two things Cainiao should avoid most in the future: firstly, undermining the Alibaba ecosystem’s commercial advantages in order to serve all platforms; and secondly, over-expanding into capital-intensive scenarios it is not well-suited to, simply to prove itself as a global logistics company.
When cross-border sellers use platform logistics services, they should not rely solely on ‘delivery within X days’ claims; it is best to simultaneously verify the HS code, declared value, destination country taxes and duties, and customs clearance requirements. Before dispatch, they can use OneCargoKit’s HS Code Lookup for an initial screening, then hand the matter over to a customs broker or logistics provider for confirmation.
The ‘Three Tong and One Da’: Having been active overseas for many years, yet for most it remains a peripheral business
All three of the “Three Tong and One Da” companies have, to varying degrees, engaged in internationalisation. YTO Express operates an air freight division and has launched international cargo routes; ZTO Express, STO Express and Yunda Express also have international operations or related network deployments.
However, from an industry perspective, the international expansion of the ‘Three Tong and One Da’ group generally appears to be a case of ‘taking action without having established a decisive strategic mindset’. In particular, compared to SF Express, JD.com and Cainiao, they lack a sufficiently clear closed-loop overseas business model.
YTO is a relatively unique case. It operates its own airline, and according to its annual report and public reports, YTO has been continuously expanding its international routes, air freight and end-to-end cross-border services, having opened more than 150 freight routes by 2024. It is not entirely without a presence in this sector; in fact, it takes its aviation resources more seriously than many of its peers.
However, the problem lies in the fact that aviation resources are merely one link in the chain. Without sufficiently robust overseas warehouses, customs clearance, local last-mile delivery and commercial entry points, chartered flights and cargo aircraft can easily become a ‘flourish that looks impressive at a certain stage’, but struggle to evolve into a long-term, stable global express network.
The DNA of the ‘Three Tong and One Da’ lies in their franchise networks and extreme cost efficiency. Whilst this DNA is a major strength for domestic e-commerce parcels, expanding overseas requires navigating entirely different constraints:
- High labour costs overseas
- Complex local regulatory compliance
- Insufficient last-mile delivery density
- Different standards for customer complaints and compensation
- Higher customs clearance and tax risks
- Greater difficulty in managing peaks and troughs during major sales events
I therefore tend to view the international expansion of the ‘Three Tong and One Da’ as follows: it can serve as a supplement, a dedicated service or an opportunity in specific regions, but it is unlikely to become the main narrative in the short term.
China Post: A ‘national team’ with solid foundations, but a structure inherently ill-suited to fast-paced commercial competition
China Post is a state-backed operator, naturally benefiting from the international postal system and a foundation of universal service. For many traditional cross-border small parcels, the postal system was once one of the most important channels.
However, when it comes to ‘commercial competition in the international market’, China Post’s problems go beyond mere ‘slowness’; rather, its institutional mechanisms are inherently ill-suited to the highly market-driven competition in cross-border e-commerce logistics.
Cross-border e-commerce logistics are evolving far too rapidly.Platform policies may change weekly; customs clearance criteria for a particular product category may suddenly be tightened; local delivery prices in Europe and the US may fluctuate rapidly due to peak seasons, labour costs, fuel prices and the risk of strikes; and sellers’ traffic sources may constantly shift between Amazon, AliExpress, Temu, TikTok Shop and independent websites.This market demands that logistics companies be able to set prices quickly, test and refine strategies rapidly, expand their networks promptly, process claims swiftly and adjust their product offerings on the fly.
This is precisely where the problem with the postal system lies: whilst there is no shortage of resources, the speed at which these resources are transformed into marketable products is too slow; the network is extensive, but a network does not equate to customer experience; and whilst it enjoys the credibility of a state-backed organisation, such credibility does not equate to commercial competitiveness.
Public records show that China Post Air launched an independently operated intercontinental route from Nanjing to Luxembourg in 2024, noting that its fleet at the time comprised over 40 aircraft, including two B777F freighters. This indicates that the postal service has not been entirely inactive, nor has it failed to make investments.
The problem is that there remains a vast gap between investment and strategy.
| The cards China Post holds | Systemic Weaknesses | Market Outcomes |
|---|
| The international postal system and the backing of the national team | Long decision-making chains and slow market feedback | Stability in abundance, but lacking in offensive capacity |
| Air and port resources | Weak product development and sales capabilities | Customers find it difficult to perceive differentiation |
| Wide coverage | Uncontrollable local last-mile experience | Suitable for basic delivery channels, but not for high-standard fulfilment |
| Strong public service character | Profit and loss pressures and commercial incentives are not sufficiently direct | It is difficult to engage in close-quarters competition in the same way as private enterprises |
To put it bluntly: whilst JD.com is rebuilding its fulfilment system overseas, Cainiao is overlaying logistics onto commercial flows, and SF Express is using its brand and air freight capabilities to address its international shortcomings, China Post is more like a player holding a strong hand but always a step behind in playing its cards.By the time its internal processes are completed, market prices, platform rules, customs clearance requirements and sellers’ needs may all have changed.
In the eyes of cross-border e-commerce sellers, China Post still resembles more of a basic, universal access channel—and a reliable backup for certain destination countries—rather than a commercial logistics partner capable of proactively devising global fulfilment solutions for brands.
Purchasing a brand-new B777F certainly makes a bold statement, but the core of a cargo airline lies not in the age of its aircraft, but in route density, cargo mix, return cargo, hub efficiency, sales organisation and product development capabilities. Without these, even the finest aircraft is merely expensive carrying capacity.
My assessment of China Post is more pessimistic than it was a few years ago: it will not disappear, nor is it without value, but unless there are significant changes to its organisational structure, market incentives and product development capabilities, it will struggle to become a leading player in China’s international express delivery sector.It is more likely to play a long-term role as a basic, emergency or inclusive logistics channel, rather than competing with commercial platforms and brand clients to rapidly enhance fulfilment experiences in the European and American markets.
A Comparative Analysis: Who Looks More Likely to Be the Future Winner
| Company | Time of Expansion Abroad | Core Strengths | Key Weaknesses | My Outlook for the Future |
|---|
| SF Express | Early | Brand, air freight, premium services, Asian network | Insufficient commercial traffic, weak last-mile delivery in Europe and the US, complex integration | Well-suited to the Asia-Pacific region and high-value supply chains |
| JD Logistics | Relatively late | Integrated warehousing and distribution, supply chain capabilities, commitment to capital-intensive operations | Significant financial pressure; challenges with local operations | Most closely resembles a serious attempt to replicate overseas fulfilment systems |
| Cainiao | Early | Alibaba’s commercial flow, cross-border small parcels, eHub | Strategic focus is wavering; organisational stability remains to be seen | Strong in e-commerce fulfilment, but needs a stable direction |
| YTO | Early | Aviation resources, cost efficiency | Insufficient closed-loop overseas operations | Opportunities to develop air routes and regional dedicated lines |
| ZTO/STO/Yunda | Have established a presence | Domestic network and cost competitiveness | Weak international brand recognition and limited commercial flow | More of an opportunistic supplement |
| China Post | Established very early on | Postal system, state-owned enterprise, basic network | Rigid mechanisms, slow market response, weak productisation | The underlying value remains, but it is unlikely to be a key player in global expansion |
If I had to choose just one company with the ‘best chance of bringing Chinese logistics to Europe and the US’, I would choose JD Logistics.
The reason is not that JD Logistics is without its problems, but rather that its challenges resemble the ‘operational ramp-up following heavy capital investment’ rather than ‘an unclear business model’. The former is difficult, but can be improved over time through scale and customer base; the latter would repeatedly drain the organisation.
Practical considerations for cross-border sellers
Do not view logistics companies’ overseas expansion as mere news; treat it as a supply chain decision.
When selecting a channel, ask yourself five questions:
- [ ] Does this company have physical warehouses and a local operations team in the destination country?
- [ ] Is customs clearance handled in-house, through a partnership, or fully outsourced?
- [ ] Who handles the final-mile delivery, and who is responsible for compensation and customer complaints?
- [ ] Are stable shipping routes and cargo space guaranteed during peak seasons?
- [ ] Are surcharges for fuel, remote locations, residential deliveries, oversized items and warehousing included in the price?
When obtaining cross-border logistics quotations, the biggest pitfall is focusing solely on the base freight rate. Many channels that appear inexpensive actually conceal their true costs within surcharges, inventory turnover, returns processing and destination country taxes and duties.Before providing a quotation, use OneCargoKit’s Surcharge Calculator to break down common surcharges; if the client requires DDP, DAP or local delivery from an overseas warehouse, we also recommend using the Incoterms 2020 Calculator to clarify the scope of responsibility in advance.
Common misconceptions
- Misconception 1: Having aircraft automatically means a company is strong in international logistics.
Air freight handles the main transport leg, but does not address customs clearance, warehousing and distribution, last-mile delivery or commercial logistics.
- Misconception 2: The more overseas warehouses, the better.
Overseas warehouses are assets, but they also represent a cost. The key factors are utilisation rates, stock turnover and order density.
- Misconception 3: Platform logistics are necessarily more reliable than independent logistics.
Platforms have advantages in terms of commercial flow, but they may also be subject to changes in platform strategy, subsidies and rules.
- Misconception 4: The cost efficiency achieved through domestic express delivery can be directly replicated in Europe and the US.
Labour costs, regulatory compliance, land costs, trade unions, taxation and delivery conditions in Europe and the US are entirely different.
- Misconception 5: China Post’s extensive network guarantees strong commercial competitiveness.
A wide network does not equate to strong products, nor does the stability of a state-owned enterprise guarantee a rapid market response. Cross-border e-commerce logistics hinges on a closed-loop system of speed, products, costs and customer experience—not merely on basic coverage.
Professional Summary
Chinese express companies expanding overseas have moved beyond the question of ‘whether they have international operations’ to the stage of ‘whether they have an overseas fulfilment system’.
SF Express excels in branding, air freight and premium services, but must overcome issues of insufficient commercial flow and a lack of capital-intensive overseas assets; JD Logistics, although a latecomer, has a clearer strategic vision, with a heavy investment in overseas warehouses and local fulfilment, making it the most promising player to watch in the future;Cainiao possesses the strongest commercial flow foundation and cross-border small-parcel capabilities, but needs to maintain a clear and stable demarcation between its platform and self-operated businesses; the ‘Three Tong and One Da’ group remains largely opportunistic in nature; China Post’s problems are more fundamental—it is not a lack of resources, but rather that the mechanisms of a state-owned enterprise are inherently conservative, slow and process-oriented, making it difficult to adapt to the rapidly changing pace of the cross-border e-commerce logistics market.
The Chinese logistics companies that truly succeed in the future will not merely be those that ‘deliver parcels from China to overseas’, but rather those capable of helping Chinese brands manage inventory, customs clearance, delivery, returns, after-sales service and data management overseas.
Ultimately, success in expanding overseas does not depend on who announced their plans first, but on who can consistently deliver superior network density, cost efficiency and customer experience in the long term.
References and Further Reading